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CHEVRON AT THE ROBERTS COURT: 
STILL FAILING AFTER ALL THESE YEARS 
Jack M. Beermann* 
INTRODUCTION 
This Essay looks at how Chevron deference1 has fared at the U.S. 
Supreme Court since John G. Roberts became Chief Justice.2  As followers 
of U.S. administrative law know, the Court‘s 1984 Chevron decision 
famously created an apparently new two-step process for reviewing federal 
agency decisions interpreting statutes they administer.  Since then, the 
Chevron decision has been the most-cited Supreme Court administrative 
law decision, and the Chevron doctrine has spawned legions of law review 
articles analyzing its numerous twists and turns.  This Essay looks at 
Chevron deference at the Roberts Court from three distinct angles.  First, 
the Essay examines the voting records of individual Justices in cases citing 
Chevron to illuminate each Justice‘s commitment to deference to agency 
statutory construction.  Second, the Essay qualitatively examines a select 
sample of opinions citing Chevron, to see whether the Roberts Court has 
been any more successful than its predecessor in constructing a coherent 
Chevron doctrine.  Third, the Essay looks closely at how the Roberts Court 
has handled one of the most vexing issues under Chevron, namely the 
boundary between Chevron deference and judicial review under other 
standards of judicial review such as the arbitrary or capricious standard that 
governs all reviewable agency action. 
To the first point, in an earlier article,3 I presented data on Justices‘ 
voting records.  In that article, I looked at all of the Supreme Court 
decisions during Chief Justice Roberts‘ first four Terms in which Chevron 
was applied by the majority or cited in a dissent.4  What I found was that 
the Court generally split along familiar ideological lines, with liberals 
 
*  Professor of Law and Harry Elwood Warren Scholar, Boston University School of Law. 
Thanks to Daniel Storms, Boston University School of Law Class of 2015, for excellent 
research assistance. 
 
 1. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 2. This Essay is part of a larger symposium entitled Chevron at 30:  Looking Back and 
Looking Forward.  For an overview of the symposium, see Peter M. Shane & Christopher J. 
Walker, Foreword:  Chevron at 30:  Looking Back and Looking Forward, 83 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 475 (2014). 
 3. See Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now:  How Chevron 
Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 839–40 
(2010). 
 4. Id. at 839 n.226. 
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deferring to liberal agency interpretations and conservatives deferring to 
conservative agency interpretations.5  During that period, when there was 
disagreement on the Court, ―there were six decisions by the conservative 
wing against deference, three decisions by the liberal wing against 
deference, two decisions by the conservative wing in favor of deference and 
four decisions by the liberal wing in favor of deference.‖6  Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Scalia and Alito voted contrary to the 
liberal/conservative divide most often, with Justice Scalia sometimes 
joining liberals to vote against deference and Justices Roberts and Alito 
sometimes joining liberals in favor of deference.7  ―Justice Scalia‘s eleven 
votes against deference was the highest number of votes among the Justices 
against deference.  Justice Alito voted most often in favor of deference with 
ten votes.‖8  Chief Justice Roberts voted with liberals twice, bringing his 
total in the period to eight votes in favor of deference.9  The updated data 
presented below confirms this general pattern.10  In recent years, however, 
Justice Alito has been deferring less often while, perhaps due to the addition 
of two liberal Justices appointed by the current President, the Court seems 
to be deferring to agency decisions in a higher proportion of cases.11 
To the second point, a perusal of decisions citing Chevron shows that the 
Roberts Court has not been more successful than the Rehnquist Court in 
bringing a measure of coherence to the Chevron doctrine.  The Court has 
not increased the clarity of the key elements of the Chevron doctrine.  The 
Court continues to ignore Chevron in cases in which, on its terms, it ought 
to be applied or at least considered, and it has not increased the certainty of 
the Mead doctrine,12 referred to as Chevron Step Zero, which maps the 
boundary between Chevron and other forms of deference.13 
To the third point, the Roberts Court has failed miserably to clarify the 
boundary between Chevron and other standards of review such as arbitrary 
or capricious review.  On the positive side, under Chief Justice Roberts‘s 
leadership, the Court has rejected arguments for exceptionalism and applied 
Chevron in at least one new context in which it had not previously been 
applied.14  It has also extended Chevron deference to statutory issues 
implicating agency jurisdiction, although in this case Chief Justice Roberts 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. See id. at 838–39 n.226. 
 7. See id. at 838–39 nn.226–27. 
 8. See id. at 839 n.227. 
 9. Id. at 839. 
 10. See infra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra note 40 (detailing Justice Alito‘s five votes against agencies since 2012); 
infra notes 46–47 and accompanying text (discussing the voting records of Justices Kagan 
and Sotomayor). 
 12. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 13. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006) (defining 
Chevron ―Step Zero‖ as ―the initial inquiry into whether the Chevron framework applies at 
all‖). 
 14. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011) 
(applying Chevron deference to Treasury regulations). 
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dissented.15  By and large, however, the uncertainty over Chevron‘s 
coverage has not been reduced.  When asked, the Court was unable to 
articulate a boundary between Chevron deference and arbitrary or 
capricious review.16  Further, the Court‘s discussion of the relationship 
between Chevron Step Two and arbitrary or capricious review has been 
confusing, and leads to uncertainty over whether Chevron is about 
deference to agency interpretation or deference to agency policymaking.17  
Finally, there are cases in which Chevron could have been employed but 
were instead decided without any explanation under another standard of 
review such as the arbitrary or capricious standard.18  In short, there is no 
way to know in advance whether a case should be decided under the 
Chevron doctrine or under the arbitrary or capricious standard specified in 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).19 
I.   CHEVRON VOTING AT THE ROBERTS COURT 
As noted in the introduction, the voting records of the Justices in 
Chevron cases during the first four Terms of the Roberts Court revealed an 
interesting pattern.  In general, when there was disagreement among the 
Justices, the voting fell along familiar liberal/conservative patterns, and did 
not seem to turn on a diversity of views concerning Chevron deference and 
related doctrines.20  The updated data indicate that this general pattern 
continues with a couple of important reservations.  First, agencies seem to 
be winning at the Supreme Court more often during the last few years 
(agencies have prevailed in 9.521 of the thirteen cases decided since the 
earlier article was published) and slightly fewer than half of the decisions 
are unanimous (six of thirteen), leaving a very small sample of 
nonunanimous decisions to analyze.22 
 
 15. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1872 (2013). 
 16. See infra notes 84–113 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra notes 84–113 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra notes 73–83 and accompanying text. 
 19. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 706 (2012). 
 20. See Beermann, supra note 3, at 838–40.  In another contribution to this symposium, 
James Brudney reviews 730 Supreme Court decisions—pre- and post-Chevron—to evaluate 
the use of Chevron and Skidmore in the workplace-law context, and his findings illustrate 
that the Justices‘ substantive views were more important than their views on the deference 
standards. See James J. Brudney, Chevron and Skidmore in the Workplace:  Unhappy 
Together, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 497, 520–21 (2014). 
 21. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2449 (2014) (employing Chevron 
analysis to uphold one of two agency interpretations, which explains the fractional total). 
 22. The nonunanimous decisions citing Chevron during the relevant period are:  Utility 
Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014); EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, 
LP, 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014); City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013); United States 
v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012); Roberts v. Sea-Land Services, 
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1350 (2012); Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474 (2010).  The unanimous 
decisions citing Chevron are:  Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center, 133 S. Ct. 817 
(2013); Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2034 (2012); Astrue v. Capato ex rel. 
B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012); Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011 (2012); Mayo 
Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011); 
Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011). 
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In the nonunanimous decisions citing Chevron since the publication of 
my prior article, the agency prevailed in 5.523 of the seven decisions.24  The 
small sample is made even smaller by the fact that one of the decisions was 
by an eight-to-one vote,25 making it impossible to characterize the decision 
along the liberal/conservative divide.  In the six remaining cases, one has a 
mixed majority and a dissent composed of three members who often vote as 
part of the conservative bloc—Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Anthony 
Kennedy and Samuel Alito.26  Another has a very mixed-up lineup, with the 
Chief Justice and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Kagan voting 
with the agency and Justices Thomas, Breyer, Alito, and Sotomayor voting 
against the agency.27  The other three fell along more familiar 
liberal/conservative patterns with slight variations.  For example, in a 2014 
case involving environmental protection, the Court approved a protective 
interpretation that had been rejected by the D.C. Circuit, with Chief Justice 
Roberts joining swing Justice Kennedy and generally liberal Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan.28  Justices Scalia and Thomas 
voted against the agency, and Justice Alito did not participate.29  In the 
other environmental law case that resulted in a victory for the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on one issue and a defeat on the 
other, liberal Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan would have 
affirmed the agency on both issues and conservative Justices Thomas and 
Alito would have rejected the agency‘s decision on both issues.30  Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Kennedy voted for the agency on 
one issue and against the agency on another.31  (On both issues, the EPA 
advanced a more environmentally protective position than the other side.)  
In a case involving the calculation of good-time credits by the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons within the Department of Justice, the three dissenters 
were swing Justice Kennedy and liberal Justices Stevens (in his last Term 
 
 23. Again, because of the split decision in Utility, the total is fractional. 
 24. I did not include Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158 (2014), because in that case, 
Chevron was raised only in dissent and the decision did not involve judicial review of an 
agency decision.  The dissent pointed out that the interpretation arrived at by the majority 
had been adopted by an agency, but not in a form that would warrant Chevron deference. Id. 
at 1186–87 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 25. Roberts, 132 S. Ct. at 1353.  Justice Ginsberg dissented in part from this eight-to-one 
decision which ruled against an employee in a dispute over workers‘ compensation benefits. 
Id. at 1363–67 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting in part). 
 26. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1865.  Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in 
favor of Chevron deference to agency decisions affecting the agency‘s jurisdiction. Id. at 
1868.  He was joined by conservative ally Justice Clarence Thomas and usually liberal 
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. Id. at 
1866.  The dissenters were Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Anthony Kennedy and Samuel 
Alito, two of the four conservative voting bloc members and swing Justice Kennedy. 
 27. Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014).  This unusual lineup may be 
due to the fact that the agency‘s decision in Cuellar de Osorio involved an interpretation of 
an immigration statute by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services that was 
unfavorable to immigrants. 
 28. EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, LP, 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014). 
 29. Id. at 1590. 
 30. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014). 
 31. See id. at 2441, 2447. 
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on the Court) and Ginsburg,32 and in a case involving tax liability, the five-
to-four decision fell along similar lines, with swing Justice Kennedy in 
dissent along with liberal Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor.33  In a 
number of these cases, generally liberal Justice Breyer voted along with the 
Court‘s conservative bloc,34 perhaps signaling that he is not as reliably 
liberal on administrative law matters as in some other areas of law.  That 
the disagreements among the Justices in these cases appear to be more 
about the underlying merits than about the proper application of Chevron 
and related doctrines confirms my general sense that the time and effort that 
litigants, and the Justices, spend analyzing whether and how Chevron 
applies is wasted. 
The aggregate voting totals for each Justice still on the Court during the 
entire period studied (since the beginning of the Roberts Court) tell an 
interesting story.  The totals are indicated in the following table.35   
 
Supreme Court Voting Splits in Cases Citing Chevron 
Supreme Court Justice With Agency Against Agency 
Chief Justice Roberts 19.5 10.5 
Justice Scalia 16.5 13.5 
Justice Kennedy 19.5 10.5 
Justice Thomas 17.0 12.0 
Justice Alito 18.0 10.0 
Justice Ginsburg 18.0 12.0 
Justice Breyer 18.0 10.0 
Justice Sotomayor 10.0   3.0 
Justice Kagan   9.0   2.0 
 
 32. Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474 (2010). 
 33. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1849–53 (2012). 
 34. See Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014); Home Concrete, 132 S. 
Ct. 1836; Barber, 560 U.S. 474.  
 35. This table reflects information gathered for this Essay and for my earlier article 
urging that the Chevron test be abandoned.  For the cases discussed in my earlier article, see 
Beermann, supra note 3, at 838 n.226.  The more recent decisions citing Chevron are:  
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014); Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 
2191; EME Homer City Generation, LP, 134 S. Ct. 1584; City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. 
Ct. 1863 (2013); Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center, 133 S. Ct. 817 (2013); 
Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2034 (2012); Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 
132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012); Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011 (2012); Home 
Concrete, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012); Roberts v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1350 
(2012); Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 
704 (2011); Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011); Barber, 560 U.S. 474.  For this 
Essay, I re-counted all of the cases, which resulted in slightly different conclusions.  
Determining which Justices were deferring to an agency and which were not was very easy 
in most of the cases.  The most difficult one to characterize was Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 
U.S. 379 (2009).  I decided to treat the eight-member majority in that case as deferring to the 
agency, and only Justice Stevens, in dissent, as voting against the agency. 
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By a small margin, Justice Scalia remained most likely to vote against an 
agency interpretation in cases citing Chevron, with 13.5 total votes against 
agencies in the thirty36 cases involving Chevron since John Roberts became 
Chief Justice.37  Justice Thomas‘s three votes against agencies in 201438 
moved him into a tie with Justice Ginsburg39 for second place with twelve 
votes against agency interpretations, with Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Kennedy tied for fourth place at 10.5,40 followed closely by Justices Alito 
and Breyer at ten each.41  Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy voted 
 
 36. Not all Justices participated in all thirty cases, either because they came on the Court 
after John Roberts became Chief Justice or due to recusal (or both). 
 37. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).  In this decision, 
Justice Scalia voted with the agency on one issue and against the agency on another; he was 
in the majority on both issues.  Justice Scalia voted against the agency in:  EME Homer City 
Generation, LP, 134 S. Ct. 1584; Freeman, 132 S. Ct. 2034; Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. 
1836; Judulang, 132 S. Ct. 476; Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519 (2009); 
Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009); Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Public 
Utility District No. 1, 554 U.S. 527 (2008); Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 
389 (2008); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007); Zuni Public 
School District No. 89 v. Department of Education, 550 U.S. 81 (2007); Global Crossing 
Telecommunications, Inc. v. Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc., 550 U.S. 45 (2007); 
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 
(2006). 
 38. In 2014, Justice Thomas voted against the agency in:  Utility, 134 S. Ct. 2427; 
Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191; EME Homer City Generation, LP, 134 S. Ct. 1584.  In 
pre-2014 cases, he voted against the agency in:  Freeman, 132 S. Ct. 2034, Home Concrete, 
132 S. Ct. 1836; Judulang, 132 S. Ct. 476; Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc., 554 U.S. 
527; Federal Express Corp., 552 U.S. 389; Ledbetter, 550 U.S. 618; Zuni Public School 
District No. 89, 550 U.S. 81; Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc., 550 U.S. 45; 
Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715. 
 39. Justice Ginsburg voted against agency interpretations in:  Freeman, 132 S. Ct. 2034; 
Roberts, 132 S. Ct. 1350; Judulang, 132 S. Ct. 476; Barber, 560 U.S. 474; Cuomo, 557 U.S. 
519; Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261 (2009); 
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009); Negusie, 555 U.S. 511; Morgan 
Stanley Capital Group Inc., 554 U.S. 527; Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1 (2008); National 
Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007); Gonzales v. Oregon, 
546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
 40. Chief Justice Roberts voted for the agency on one issue and against the agency in the 
other in Utility, 134 S. Ct. 2427.  He voted against the agency in:  City of Arlington, 133 S. 
Ct. 1863; Freeman, 132 S. Ct. 2034; Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. 1836; Judulang, 132 S. Ct. 
476; Negusie, 555 U.S. 511; Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc., 554 U.S. 527; Ledbetter, 
550 U.S. 618; Zuni Public School District No. 89, 550 U.S. 81; Watters, 550 U.S. 1; 
Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715.  Justice Kennedy voted against agency interpretations in:  Utility, 
134 S. Ct. 2427 (one of two issues); City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. 1863; Freeman, 132 S. Ct. 
2034; Judulang, 132 S. Ct. 476; Barber, 560 U.S. 474; Negusie, 555 U.S. 511; Morgan 
Stanley Capital Group Inc., 554 U.S. 527; Dada, 554 U.S. 1; Ledbetter, 550 U.S. 618; 
Gonzales, 546 U.S. 243; Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715. 
 41. Justice Breyer voted against agency interpretations in:  Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 
2191; Freeman, 132 S. Ct. 2034; Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. 1836; Judulang, 132 S. Ct. 476; 
Cuomo, 557 U.S. 519; Negusie, 555 U.S. 511; Morgan Stanley Capital Group. Inc., 554 U.S. 
527; Dada, 554 U.S. 1; National Ass’n of Home Builders, 551 U.S. 644; Gonzales, 546 U.S. 
243.  Justice Alito voted against agency interpretations in:  Utility, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (on both 
issues); Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191; City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. 1863; Freeman, 
132 S. Ct. 2034; Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. 1836; Judulang, 132 S. Ct. 476; Negusie, 555 
U.S. 511; Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc., 554 U.S. 527; Ledbetter, 550 U.S. 618; 
Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715. 
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with agencies the most with 19.5 votes each,42 followed closely by Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito with 18 votes each in favor of agencies.43  Of 
the Justices who have served for the entire Roberts Court, Justices Thomas 
and Scalia have voted with agencies the fewest number of times, with 17 
and 16.5 votes respectively.44  In their shorter time on the Court, Justices 
 
 42. Chief Justice Roberts voted in favor of agency interpretations in:  EME Homer City 
Generation, LP, 134 S. Ct. 1584; Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191; Sebelius v. Auburn 
Regional Medical Center, 133 S. Ct. 817 (2013); Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 
2021 (2012); Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011 (2012); Roberts, 132 S. Ct. 
1350; Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 
(2011); Barber, 560 U.S. 474; Cuomo, 557 U.S. 519; Coeur Alaska, Inc., 557 U.S. 261; 
Entergy Corp., 556 U.S. 208; Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009); United States v. 
Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 305 (2009); Dada, 554 U.S. 1; Federal Express Corp., 552 U.S. 389; 
National Ass’n of Home Builders, 551 U.S. 644; Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 
551 U.S. 158 (2007); Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc., 550 U.S. 45; Gonzales, 
546 U.S. 243.  In Utility, 134 S. Ct. 2427, Chief Justice Roberts voted with the agency on 
one issue and against the agency on another.  Justice Kennedy voted in favor of agency 
interpretations in:  Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191; EME Homer City Generation, LP, 
134 S. Ct. 1584; Auburn Regional Medical Center, 133 S. Ct. 817; Astrue, 132 S. Ct. 2021; 
Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011; Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. 1836; Roberts, 132 S. Ct. 
1350; Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research, 131 S. Ct. 704; Cuomo, 557 
U.S. 519; Coeur Alaska, Inc., 557 U.S. 261; Entergy Corp., 556 U.S. 208; Eurodif S.A., 555 
U.S. 305;  Carcieri, 555 U.S. 379; Federal Express Corp., 552 U.S. 389; National Ass’n of 
Home Builders, 551 U.S. 644; Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., 551 U.S. 158; Global 
Crossing Telecommunication, Inc., 550 U.S. 45; Zuni Public School District No. 89, 550 
U.S. 81; Watters, 550 U.S. 1.  In Utility, 134 S. Ct. 2427, Justice Kennedy voted with the 
agency on one issue and against the agency on another. 
 43. Justice Breyer voted with the agency in:  Utility, 134 S. Ct. 2427; EME Homer City 
Generation, LP, 134 S. Ct. 1584; City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. 1863; Auburn Regional 
Medical Center, 133 S. Ct. 817; Astrue, 132 S. Ct. 2021; Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 
2011; Roberts, 132 S. Ct. 1350; Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research, 131 
S. Ct. 704; Barber, 560 U.S. 474; Coeur Alaska, Inc., 557 U.S. 261; Entergy Corp., 556 U.S. 
208; Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 305; Federal Express Corp., 552 U.S. 389; Long Island Care at 
Home, Ltd., 551 U.S. 158; Ledbetter, 550 U.S. 618; Global Crossing Telecommunications, 
Inc., 550 U.S. 45; Zuni Pub. School District No. 89, 550 U.S. 81; Watters, 550 U.S. 1; 
Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715.  In Entergy, although Justice Breyer dissented in part on the 
Chevron issue, he agreed with the agency (and the Court majority).  Justice Ginsburg voted 
with the agency in:  Utility, 134 S. Ct. 2427; Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191; EME 
Homer City Generation, LP, 134 S. Ct. 1584; City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. 1863; Auburn 
Regional Medical Center, 133 S. Ct. 817; Astrue, 132 S. Ct. 2021; Martinez Gutierrez, 132 
S. Ct. 2011; Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. 1836; Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & 
Research, 131 S. Ct. 704; Carcieri, 555 U.S. 379; Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 305; Federal 
Express Corp., 552 U.S. 389; Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., 551 U.S. 158; Ledbetter, 550 
U.S. 618; Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc., 550 U.S. 45; Zuni Public School 
District. No. 89, 550 U.S. 81; Watters, 550 U.S. 1; Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715.  Justice Alito 
voted with the agency in:  Auburn Regional Medical Center, 133 S. Ct. 817; Astrue, 132 S. 
Ct. 2021; Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011; Roberts, 132 S. Ct. 1350; Mayo Foundation 
for Medical Education & Research, 131 S. Ct. 704; Barber, 560 U.S. 474; Cuomo, 557 U.S. 
519; Coeur Alaska, Inc., 557 U.S. 261; Entergy Corp., 556 U.S. 208; Carcieri, 555 U.S. 379; 
Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 305; Dada, 554 U.S. 1; Federal Express Corp., 552 U.S. 389; 
National Ass’n of Home Builders, 551 U.S. 644; Long Island Care at Home, Ltd., 551 U.S. 
158; Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc., 550 U.S. 45; Zuni Public School District 
No. 89, 550 U.S. 81; Watters, 550 U.S. 1. 
 44. Justice Scalia voted with the agency in:  Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191; City of 
Arlington, 133 S. Ct. 1863; Auburn Regional Medical Center, 133 S. Ct. 817; Astrue, 132 S. 
Ct. 2021; Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011; Roberts, 132 S. Ct. 1350; Mayo Foundation 
for Medical Education & Research, 131 S. Ct. 704; Barber, 560 U.S. 474; Coeur Alaska, 
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Sotomayor and Kagan have voted in favor of agency interpretations in a 
higher proportion of cases than other Justices:  Justice Kagan has nine votes 
in favor of agencies and two votes against;45 Justice Sotomayor has ten 
votes in favor of agencies and three votes against.46  Perhaps it should not 
be surprising that relatively liberal Justices would vote in favor of agencies 
during a liberal presidency, especially during the tenure of the President 
who appointed them. 
II.  A QUALITATIVE LOOK AT A FEW INTERESTING  
ROBERTS COURT CHEVRON CASES 
This part looks qualitatively at a few of the Court‘s recent decisions 
under Chevron to illustrate the Court‘s continued failure to clarify the 
Chevron doctrine.  It also briefly examines a relatively new controversy 
over deference to agency construction of the agency‘s own regulations 
under what has become known as ―Auer deference.‖47  This is not meant to 
be a representative sample, but these cases raise interesting questions about 
Chevron and the Roberts Court that are not discussed in Part III. 
Agency flexibility after initial judicial review has been an area of 
particular controversy under Chevron.  Agencies sometimes change their 
views on issues48 to which Chevron applies even after the agency‘s prior 
views have been subjected to judicial review.  In two pre-Roberts Court 
decisions, the Court rejected Chevron deference when, in its view, the 
Court had already determined the meaning of the statute at issue, not merely 
 
Inc., 557 U.S. 261; Entergy Corp., 556 U.S. 208; Carcieri, 555 U.S. 379; Eurodif S.A., 555 
U.S. 305; Dada, 554 U.S. 1; National Ass’n of Home Builders, 551 U.S. 644; Long Island 
Care at Home, Ltd., 551 U.S. 158; Gonzales, 546 U.S. 243.  In Utility, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 
Justice Scalia voted with the agency on one issue and against the agency on another.  Justice 
Thomas voted with the agency in:  City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. 1863; Auburn Regional 
Medical Center, 133 S. Ct. 817; Astrue, 132 S. Ct. 2021; Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 
2011; Roberts, 132 S. Ct. 1350; Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research, 131 
S. Ct. 704 ; Barber, 560 U.S. 474; Cuomo, 557 U.S. 519; Coeur Alaska, Inc., 557 U.S. 261; 
Entergy Corp., 556 U.S. 208; Negusie, 555 U.S. 511; Carcieri, 555 U.S. 379; Eurodif S.A., 
555 U.S. 305; Dada, 554 U.S. 1; National Ass’n of Home Builders, 551 U.S. 644; Long 
Island Care at Home, Ltd., 551 U.S. 158; Gonzales, 546 U.S. 243. 
 45. Justice Kagan voted with the agency in Utility, 134 S. Ct. 2427; Cuellar de Osorio, 
134 S. Ct. 2191; EME Homer City Generation, LP, 134 S. Ct. 1584; City of Arlington, 133 
S. Ct. 1863; Auburn Regional Medical Center, 133 S. Ct. 817; Astrue, 132 S. Ct. 2021; 
Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011; Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. 1836; Roberts, 132 S. Ct. 
1350.  She voted against the agency in Judulang, 132 S. Ct. 476, and Freeman, 132 S. Ct. 
2034. 
 46. Justice Sotomayor voted with the agency in:  Utility, 134 S. Ct. 2427; EME Homer 
City Generation, LP, 134 S. Ct. 1584; City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. 1863; Auburn Regional 
Medical Center, 133 S. Ct. 817; Astrue, 132 S. Ct. 2021; Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 
2011; Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. 1836; Roberts, 132 S. Ct. 1350; Mayo Foundation for 
Medical Education & Research, 131 S. Ct. 704 ; Barber, 560 U.S. 474.  She voted against 
the agency in:  Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191; Freeman, 132 S. Ct. 2034; Judulang, 132 
S. Ct. 476. 
 47. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); see also Christensen v. Harris County, 
529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000) (using the term ―Auer deference‖ for the first time). 
 48. Although it might be appropriate to be more specific and characterize the issue as 
changed agency views on issues of ―statutory interpretation,‖ I hesitate to do so because of 
the Court‘s continued lack of clarity over the nature of the issues to which Chevron applies. 
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upheld the agencies‘ interpretations under deferential judicial review.49  
However, when an agency‘s prior interpretation had been upheld on 
deferential judicial review, the situation was not so clear.  In National 
Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services,50 decided 
just before Chief Justice Roberts joined the Court, Justice Thomas‘s opinion 
for the Court explicitly provided for the possibility that an agency‘s 
interpretation might receive Chevron deference even if a reviewing court 
had previously adopted a contrary interpretation:   ―[a] court‘s prior judicial 
construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to 
Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its 
construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus 
leaves no room for agency discretion.‖51  In Chevron terms, what this 
seems to mean is that if the meaning of the statute was determined under 
Chevron Step One, the agency cannot adopt a different interpretation, but if 
the agency had been upheld under Chevron Step Two, the agency remains 
free to adopt a different ―permissible‖ interpretation.52 
This doctrine was tested recently in United States v. Home Concrete & 
Supply, LLC,53 involving a new Treasury rule that was contrary to a prior 
Supreme Court decision on the same matter.54  A plurality of the Court, in 
an opinion by Justice Breyer, held that the government‘s new rule was not 
entitled to Chevron deference because it was directly contrary to the Court‘s 
prior decision in Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner.55  In that case, the Court 
had rejected the agency‘s reading of the statute, which might indicate that it 
was hopeless for the agency to try again, since it meant either that the Court 
determined the statute‘s clear and unambiguous meaning, or that the 
agency‘s interpretation was not ―permissible.‖56  However, because Colony 
was decided long before Chevron, the implications are not so clear.  The 
Court in Colony explicitly stated that the statute was ―ambiguous‖ with 
regard to the issue in the case, and then the Court went on to employ 
traditional statutory construction principles to arrive at what it found to be 
the best reading of the statute.57  Had Colony been litigated post-Chevron, 
 
 49. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992); Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. 
Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116 (1990). 
 50. Nat‘l Cable & Telecomms. Ass‘n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 51. Id. at 982.  As Abbe Gluck notes in her contribution to this symposium, Brand X has 
―enormous repercussions for the allocation of power between courts and agencies.‖ Abbe R. 
Gluck, What 30 Years of Chevron Teach Us About the Rest of Statutory Interpretation, 83 
FORDHAM L. REV. 607, 625 (2014). 
 52. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
Additional complications arise when the initial judicial interpretation was rendered in a 
controversy between two private parties not involving an agency interpretation.  Those 
complications are not addressed here. 
 53. 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Colony, Inc. v. Comm‘r, 357 U.S. 28 (1958). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id.  ―Although we are inclined to think that the statute on its face lends itself more 
plausibly to the taxpayer‘s interpretation, it cannot be said that the language is unambiguous. 
In these circumstances we turn to the legislative history of § 275(c).‖ Id. at 33. The Court 
also cited the purposes of the provision at issue and the decisions of four Courts of Appeals 
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the finding of statutory ambiguity presumably would have sent the case to 
Chevron Step Two, under which the agency‘s interpretation would have 
been evaluated under the ―permissible construction‖ standard.  Perhaps it 
would have been upheld. 
Justice Breyer‘s plurality opinion in Home Concrete did not satisfactorily 
answer the government‘s argument for Chevron deference, which was noted 
in Justice Kennedy‘s dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan.58  Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, would 
have resolved the case under Chevron Step Two and would have found that 
the government‘s new interpretation was unreasonable.59  Justice 
Kennedy‘s group of four dissenting Justices concluded that the Brand X 
issue was irrelevant to the case because the statute had been altered so much 
on reenactment after Colony that the agency was not constrained by the 
Court‘s interpretation of the prior statutory provision.60  Accordingly, it is 
uncertain whether the plurality‘s understanding of Brand X would be 
adopted by a majority of the Court, leaving an annoying lack of clarity over 
whether pre-Chevron judicial interpretations of ambiguous statutes are 
binding on agencies post-Chevron.  However, looking at the lineup of 
Justices‘ votes, perhaps once again what we see is a case decided based on 
the substantive views of the Justices in accord with the familiar 
liberal/conservative divide on the Court (with Justice Breyer displaying his 
somewhat more conservative views on regulatory matters than in other 
areas) and not by any systematic application of principles of judicial 
review.61  Unless the Court adopts and applies a firm rule that agencies 
 
(other than the one under review which the Court was reversing) for support. Id. at 36–37.  
Two dissenters stated that they ―would follow the interpretation consistently given § 275(c) 
by the Tax Court for many years and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this 
case.‖ See id. at 38 (Warren, C.J. & Black, J., dissenting). 
 58. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1851–52 (2012) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 59. Id. at 1847 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (―[H]aving 
decided to stand by Colony and to stand by Brand X as well, the plurality should have 
found—in order to reach the decision it did—that the Treasury Department‘s current 
interpretation was unreasonable.‖).  Justice Scalia found that in order for the plurality to 
avoid Chevron analysis, it had to revise the relationship between Chevron and Brand X: 
To trigger the Brand X power of an authorized ―gap-filling‖ agency to give content 
to an ambiguous text, a pre-Chevron determination that language is ambiguous 
does not alone suffice; the pre-Chevron Court must in addition have found that 
Congress wanted the particular ambiguity in question to be resolved by the 
agency.  And here, today‘s plurality opinion finds, ―[t]here is no reason to believe 
that the linguistic ambiguity noted by Colony reflects a post-Chevron conclusion 
that Congress had delegated gap-filling power to the agency.‖  The notion, 
seemingly, is that post-Chevron a finding of ambiguity is accompanied by a 
finding of agency authority to resolve the ambiguity, but pre-Chevron that was not 
so.  The premise is false.  Post-Chevron cases do not ―conclude‖ that Congress 
wanted the particular ambiguity resolved by the agency; that is simply the legal 
effect of ambiguity—a legal effect that should obtain whenever the language is in 
fact (as Colony found) ambiguous. 
Id. at 1847. 
 60. Id. at 1852 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 61. See supra notes 22–42 and accompanying text (discussing the voting splits of 
Supreme Court Justices). 
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cannot under any circumstances return to interpretations that had been 
rejected pre-Chevron, even if the pre-Chevron Court‘s analysis was less 
deferential than Chevron Step Two, the Court‘s decisions in such cases do 
not appear to be constrained by the Chevron framework or any other 
discernible set of interpretive principles. 
Related to Chevron deference is the question whether agencies‘ views on 
the meaning of their own regulations should receive deference.  For some 
time, the conventional wisdom has been that agencies should receive a great 
deal of deference when they interpret their own regulations, perhaps even 
more deference than Chevron Step Two.62  The standard has been stated as 
requiring acceptance of an agency‘s view of the meaning of its own 
regulations, unless the agency‘s interpretation is ―plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation.‖63  The reason for this deference should be 
obvious:   as compared with reviewing courts, agencies are likely to have 
superior knowledge of the meaning of regulations that they drafted, and 
agency expertise is likely to contribute to agencies‘ ability to construe their 
regulations.  However, this deference presents its own dangers:   ―Auer 
deference encourages agencies to be ‗vague in framing regulations, with the 
plan of issuing ―interpretations‖ to create the intended new law without 
observance of notice and comment procedures.‘‖64  Justice Scalia is 
currently alone on the Court in refusing to defer to agency interpretations of 
their own regulations, but Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito have 
expressed a willingness to examine the issue when it is properly raised by 
the parties to a case.65  Does this willingness arise out of concern over 
deference generally, or is this the conservative wing of the Court regretting 
that its doctrines currently result in deference to agencies within a relatively 
liberal administration? 
III.   CONTINUED UNCLARITY ON CHEVRON‘S DOMAIN66 
A major problem with the Chevron doctrine, going back to the immediate 
aftermath of the Chevron decision itself, has been the lack of a discernible 
boundary between cases that should be resolved using Chevron deference 
and cases that should be resolved under some other doctrine, such as the 
less deferential Skidmore deference, non-deferential statutory construction, 
or arbitrary or capricious review under the Administrative Procedure Act 
§ 706(2)(A).67  At first, the difficulty involved Chevron‘s suggestion that 
 
 62. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 
325 U.S. 410 (1945). 
 63. Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414. 
 64. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1341 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Robert Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA:  Sometimes They Just Don’t Get 
It, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 11–12 (1996)); see also John F. Manning, Constitutional 
Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. 
REV. 612 (1996). 
 65. Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1338–39 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 66. The phrase ―Chevron‘s domain‖ was coined by Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. 
Hickman in their 2001 article Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001). 
 67. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
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―[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction.‖68  
The implication, picked up again by the Court in 1987, was that ―pure 
question[s] of statutory construction‖ are ―for the courts to decide‖69 and 
are thus not subject to Chevron deference.  This controversy, which has 
persisted into the Roberts Court,70 leaves unsettled a fundamental question 
about Chevron deference—does it involve deference to decisions of 
statutory construction or deference to agency policy decisions?71  Unless 
the Roberts Court resolves this issue, it cannot claim success in taming the 
Chevron doctrine. 
Despite this puzzling controversy over whether Chevron applies to 
decisions of statutory construction, the Court has developed a parallel 
doctrine, known as the Mead standard, referred to by many scholars as 
Chevron Step Zero,72 purporting to govern whether Chevron or Skidmore 
deference applies to review of a particular agency statutory interpretation.  
Building upon the congressional intent basis for Chevron deference, the 
Mead doctrine instructs federal courts to apply Chevron when governing 
statutes indicate ―express congressional authorizations to engage in the 
process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings 
for which deference is claimed.‖73  As the Court explained, ―[i]t is fair to 
assume generally that Congress contemplates administrative action with the 
effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative 
procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should 
underlie a pronouncement of such force.‖74  Because the Court did not 
create a bright line rule reserving Chevron deference for cases involving 
rulemaking or formal adjudication (or requiring Chevron deference in such 
cases), Justice Scalia rightly complained in dissent that Mead created 
additional uncertainty over the applicability of Chevron.75  Although some 
cases may be easy under Mead,76 uncertainty over application of this 
doctrine has persisted in recent years,77 and shows no signs of abating. 
 
 68. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 
(1984). 
 69. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987). 
 70. In one of his last opinions as a member of the Court, Justice Stevens, the author of 
Chevron, protested that the issue in Negusie v. Holder was a ―pure question of statutory 
construction for the courts to decide‖ and thus was not subject to Chevron deference. 555 
U.S. 511, 529 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 71. See Beermann, supra note 3, at 804–07. 
 72. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).  A number of other contributions 
to this symposium focus extensively on this Chevron Step-Zero question. See Kristin E. 
Hickman, The Three Phases of Mead, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 527, 528–30 (2014); Thomas W. 
Merrill, Step Zero After City of Arlington, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 753, 756–58 (2014); Peter 
L. Strauss, In Search of Skidmore, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 789, 792–93 (2014). 
 73. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229. 
 74. Id. at 230. 
 75. Id. at 245 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 76. United States v. Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 305, 316 (2009). 
 77. Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474 (2010).  Justice Breyer‘s majority opinion cites 
Chevron, but Justice Kennedy‘s dissenting opinion, for himself and Justices Stevens and 
Ginsburg, argues that under Mead, the decision at issue should not have been analyzed under 
Chevron. See id. at 2516–17 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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Chevron will not succeed unless and until the Court provides clear 
instructions on when it applies and when it does not. 
Another point of uncertainty is the boundary between Chevron deference 
and review under the APA‘s arbitrary or capricious standard.  In many 
cases, the issue is not mentioned, and the Court resolves the case under one 
standard or the other, presumably because that is how the case was litigated 
by the parties.  The best example of this is the Court‘s decision in FCC v. 
Fox Television Stations, Inc.,78 a widely noted case involving the Federal 
Communications Commission‘s (FCC) regulation of the broadcast of 
indecent language.79  The federal Communications Act provides for fines 
and imprisonment of any broadcaster that ―utters any obscene, indecent, or 
profane language‖ on radio or television between the hours of 6 a.m. and 
midnight.80  The FCC has power to enforce this prohibition through civil 
penalties and adverse licensing decisions.81 
After years of decisions in which the FCC determined that no 
enforcement action would be taken against fleeting, nonliteral uses of 
vulgar language, in 2004, the agency reversed course and decided that even 
a fleeting use of certain words violated the ban on indecent language.82  The 
agency then cited (but did not fine or otherwise penalize) Fox Television 
for airing vulgar language during live broadcasts of the 2002 and 2003 
Golden Globe awards.83  On judicial review, the Second Circuit reversed, 
finding that under the Supreme Court‘s application of APA § 706(2)(A)‘s 
arbitrary or capricious standard in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. 
State Farm,84 the FCC had not adequately justified its change in policy.85  
The Supreme Court then reversed the Second Circuit, declaring that the 
case did not require greater justification for agency policy changes than for 
initial policy decisions.86 
For present purposes, the important point about Fox Television is that 
Chevron was not cited in Justice Scalia‘s majority opinion or in any of the 
four concurring and dissenting opinions.  The question is why not?  The 
decision seems to turn on the Commission‘s understanding of the meaning 
of ―obscene, indecent, or profane language.‖87  In fact, the Commission‘s 
decision in Fox Television is a similar mix of linguistic and policy 
considerations as the EPA‘s decision in Chevron that the Clean Air Act‘s 
provision requiring the EPA to regulate ―stationary sources‖ of air pollution 
can be understood to accommodate the bubble concept approved in 
 
 78. 556 U.S. 502 (2009). 
 79. Id. 
 80. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2012); note following 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2012). 
 81. See Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 506 (2009) (citing various provisions of the Public 
Telecommunications Act of 1992). 
 82. See In re Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of 
the ―Golden Globe Awards‖ Program, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975, 4976 n.4 (2004). 
 83. Id. at 4982–83. 
 84. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass‘n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29 (1983). 
 85. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 455 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 86. Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 530. 
 87. Id. at 505. 
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Chevron.88  There is simply no way to know in advance whether an agency 
decision like the one in Fox Television should be analyzed under Chevron 
or under the APA‘s arbitrary or capricious standard. 
The one time that the Court has directly confronted the boundary 
between Chevron deference and arbitrary or capricious review, the Court 
failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for choosing one over the other.  
In Judulang v. Holder,89 the Court reviewed a Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) doctrine governing discretionary relief from deportation for 
noncitizen convicted criminals.90  Called the ―comparable-grounds‖ rule in 
rules promulgated in 200491 and a BIA decision from 2005,92 it was 
determined that deportable aliens were entitled to consideration for 
discretionary relief only if the grounds for deportation were comparable to 
grounds for exclusion under repealed § 212(c) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA).93  A split among the circuits developed over 
whether the comparable-grounds rule was a proper approach, with the 
Second Circuit rejecting the doctrine94 and every other circuit that 
considered the matter accepting it.95 
The Supreme Court rejected the comparable-grounds rule, finding it to be 
arbitrary or capricious.96  The Solicitor General had argued that the 
comparable-grounds rule was entitled to deference under Chevron Step 
Two due to the ambiguity of former § 212(c) of the INA.97  Judulang‘s brief 
argued instead for review under the arbitrary or capricious standard, but 
claimed in a footnote that the result would be the same either way because 
the real question under Chevron Step Two is ―whether the BIA‘s policy is 
 
 88. The EPA‘s decision whether to use the ―bubble‖ concept in defining ―stationary 
source‖ under the Clean Air Act involved both a linguistic question of whether ―stationary 
source‖ could bear the EPA‘s proposed interpretation and whether the ―bubble‖ was an 
effective method of regulating air pollution. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 854 (1984).  Similarly, the FCC‘s decision that fleeting uses of 
certain words were encompassed in the statutory phrase ―obscene, indecent, or profane 
language‖ raised both the linguistic question of the meaning of the statutory phrase and 
whether treating the words in question that way made sense as a matter of policy. See Fox 
Television, 556 U.S. at 509–10. 
 89. 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011). 
 90. Id. at 483. 
 91. See Application for the Exercise of Discretion Under Former Section 212(c), 8 
C.F.R. § 1212.3 (2010). 
 92. See In re Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722 (B.I.A. 2005). 
 93. The Supreme Court decided in INS v. St. Cyr that aliens whose crimes pre-dated the 
1996 repeal of § 212(c) were entitled to have their cases determined under prior law because 
they may have relied on § 212(c) when deciding whether to plead guilty. 533 U.S. 289, 326 
(2001). 
 94. See Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 95. See generally Koussan v. Holder, 556 F.3d 403 (6th Cir. 2009); Abebe v. Gonzales, 
493 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2007); Caroleo v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2007); Valere v. 
Gonzales, 473 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2007); Kim v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 96. Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483–84 (2011). 
 97. See Brief for Respondent at 19, Judulang, 132 S. Ct. 476 (No. 10-694), 2011 WL 
3821400, at *19. 
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‗arbitrary or capricious in substance.‘‖98  The Supreme Court, in an opinion 
by Justice Elena Kagan, gave two reasons for rejecting Chevron deference 
in the case, the first one adopting the petitioner‘s argument that arbitrary or 
capricious review and Chevron Step Two are the same, and the second that 
the BIA‘s decision was not a matter of statutory construction:   
The Government urges us instead to analyze this case under the second 
step of the test we announced in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., to govern judicial review of an agency‘s statutory 
interpretations.  Were we to do so, our analysis would be the same, 
because under Chevron step two, we ask whether an agency interpretation 
is ―‗arbitrary or capricious in substance.‘‖ Mayo Foundation for Medical 
Ed. and Research v. United States.  But we think the more apt analytic 
framework in this case is standard ―arbitrary [or] capricious‖ review 
under the APA.  The BIA‘s comparable-grounds policy, as articulated in 
In re Blake, and In re Brieva–Perez, is not an interpretation of any 
statutory language—nor could it be, given that § 212(c) does not mention 
deportation cases.99 
While the Court may be correct that arbitrary or capricious review is the 
more ―apt analytic framework,‖ neither of the Court‘s reasons supports this 
conclusion.100 
The Court‘s first reason for rejecting Chevron deference in Judulang—
that ―our analysis would be the same‖101 under Chevron Step Two and the 
arbitrary or capricious standard—is puzzling at best.  The analysis under 
Chevron Step Two is completely different from the usual analysis under the 
arbitrary or capricious standard.  Chevron Step Two asks simply whether 
the agency‘s interpretation is reasonable or permissible.102  Arbitrary or 
capricious review asks whether the agency took a hard look at the issues 
relevant to the policy decision under review, whether the agency considered 
the relevant factors, whether there is a rational connection between the facts 
found and the choice made, whether the agency made a clear error in 
judgment,103 and whether the agency decision ―is so implausible that it 
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency 
expertise.‖104  In the Chevron opinion, the Court disavowed judicial review 
of the policy implications of statutory construction,105 while the heart of 
 
 98. Brief for Petitioner at 44 n.16, Judulang, 132 S. Ct. 476 (No. 10-694), 2011 WL 
2678268, at *44 n.16 (quoting Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 
131 S. Ct. 704, 711 (2011)). 
 99. Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 483 n.7 (citations omitted). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) 
(―Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question 
for the court is whether the agency‘s answer is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.‖). 
 103. See generally Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass‘n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983); Citizens To Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
 104. Motor Vehicle, 463 U.S. at 43. 
 105. ―When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly 
conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency‘s policy, rather than whether it is 
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arbitrary or capricious review is examination of the policy basis for agency 
action.106  The analysis could not be more different and is certainly not ―the 
same.‖ 
I recognize that the Court has stated more than once that Chevron Step 
Two is equivalent to arbitrary or capricious review,107 most recently in 
2012 with the following language:  ―The Commissioner‘s regulations are 
neither ‗arbitrary or capricious in substance, [n]or manifestly contrary to the 
statute.‘ They thus warrant the Court‘s approbation.‖108  As I have 
previously explained, and for the reasons recited above, this statement 
makes little sense.109  There is no opinion in which the Court, applying Step 
Two, examines the wisdom of agency policy decisions in the manner 
typical of judicial review under the arbitrary or capricious standard. 
The Court‘s second reason for rejecting Chevron deference in 
Judulang—that it ―is not an interpretation of any statutory language‖110—
also fails to provide a satisfactory boundary between Chevron cases and 
arbitrary or capricious cases.  As noted above, the Fox Television case 
involved the interpretation of the provision of the Communications Act 
prohibiting the broadcast of obscene, indecent, and profane language, and 
yet Chevron did not apply.111  Under Chevron, if the statutory language 
does not address the issue involved in the case, then the legal decision, like 
the one in Judulang, would be reviewed under Chevron Step Two.112  The 
Court‘s second reason is also inconsistent with the Court‘s prior 
decisions113 that equate Chevron Step Two with review of the wisdom of 
the agency‘s policy choice.  Under these opinions, the question is whether 
the agency reached a reasonable policy decision,114 not whether the 
agency‘s decision is consistent with the statutory language.  And if this is 
really the reason for not applying Chevron in Judulang, then the Court‘s 
 
a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail.‖ Chevron, 
467 U.S. at 866. 
 106. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416 (―[T]he court must consider whether the decision was 
based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of 
judgment.‖); Motor Vehicle, 463 U.S. at 43 (same). 
 107. In Judulang, the Court cited Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. 
United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 711 (2011), and Household Credit Services, Inc. v. Pfennig, 
541 U.S. 232, 242 (2004), for this point.  The latter decision provides better support than the 
former:  ―Because § 1605 is ambiguous, the Board‘s regulation implementing § 1605 ‗is 
binding in the courts unless procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute.‘‖  Household Credit Servs., 541 U.S. at 242 (quoting 
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001));  see also Verizon Commc‘ns Inc. v. 
FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 527 n.38 (2002). 
 108. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2034 (2012) (citing Mayo Found. 
for Med. Educ. & Research, 131 S. Ct. at 711 and Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 217–
222, 225 (2002)). 
 109. Beermann, supra note 3, at 806–07. 
 110. Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 483 n.7. 
 111. See supra notes 81–88 and accompanying text. 
 112. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 
(1984). 
 113. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text. 
 114. See supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text (discussing Step Two and arbitrary 
or capricious standard). 
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first reason, that the analysis would be the same, makes no sense.  Perhaps 
by ―analysis‖ the Court meant ―result,‖ but if that is the case, it constitutes a 
serious slip of the pen. 
Further evidence of the Roberts Court‘s failure to clarify the boundary 
between the Chevron doctrine and arbitrary or capricious review is 
illustrated by the diversity of approaches taken by the lower courts 
reviewing BIA decisions applying the comparable-grounds rule that was 
rejected in Judulang.  None of the circuits either accepting or rejecting the 
comparable-grounds doctrine analyzed the case under the arbitrary or 
capricious standard employed by the Supreme Court in Judulang.  Two 
accepted it under Chevron deference115 and three accepted it without citing 
either Chevron or the arbitrary or capricious standard.116  The one circuit 
that, like the Supreme Court, rejected the comparable-grounds rule, did so 
based on the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, rejecting Chevron 
deference but not applying the arbitrary or capricious standard.117  
Something is amiss if six Courts of Appeals fail to apply what the Supreme 
Court identifies as the proper standard of judicial review.118  The Court 
needs to provide clearer instructions to the lower courts.119 
Additional evidence exists that uncertainty over Chevron‘s domain has 
persisted in the Roberts Court.  In Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast Alaska 
Conservation Council,120 the Court approved the EPA‘s interpretation of 
the Clean Water Act that granted the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
authority to grant permits to discharge combined solid matter and water into 
a body of water protected under the Clean Water Act.121  Environmental 
groups had claimed that the Corps did not have authority to grant the 
permits because the discharges violated the Act.122  The opinions in the 
 
 115. See generally Abebe v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2007); Caroleo v. 
Gonzales, 476 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 116. See generally Koussan v. Holder, 556 F.3d 403 (6th Cir. 2009); Valere v. Gonzales, 
473 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2007); Kim v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 117. Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 100 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 118. As Richard Re has recently observed, the Courts of Appeals have not received clear 
instructions from the Supreme Court on the basic question of how many steps the Chevron 
doctrine contains. See Richard M. Re, Should Chevron Have Two Steps?, 89 IND. L.J. 605, 
637 (2014) (―The fact that federal judges sometimes dispute whether to adhere to traditional 
two-step Chevron demonstrates that the choice among the varieties of Chevron has real 
consequences. . . .  What courts need are principles for the appropriate exercise of their 
Chevron discretion.‖). 
 119. In his contribution to this symposium, Peter Shane defends the status quo failure to 
draw clear lines between the two inquiries. Peter M. Shane, Chevron Deference, the Rule of 
Law, and Presidential Influence in the Administrative State, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 679, 689–
90 (2014); accord Shane & Walker, supra note 2, at 483 n.53 (―Whether a court uses one or 
the other rubric for its decision is most likely to turn on whether the challenge to agency 
reasonableness is based on an alleged lack of principled connection between agency action 
and the purposes and boundaries set in the relevant statute—which makes the dispute look 
interpretive—or whether the agency is assertedly lacking in its demonstration that the 
connections it posits actually exist on the record, which sounds more like an arbitrary and 
capricious challenge.‖). 
 120. Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261 (2009). 
 121. Id. at 273–75. 
 122. Id. at 266. 
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case are all over the place with regard to the applicability of Chevron.  The 
majority opinion by Justice Kennedy first resolved the issue of whether the 
Corps has authority to grant the permits by reading the statute itself and 
without mentioning Chevron.123  Then, the Court addressed whether the 
particular permits were lawful.  The Court applied Chevron, found the 
relevant provision ambiguous and deferred ―to the agencies‘ reasonable 
decision to continue their prior practice.‖124  However, the Court found that 
the EPA‘s memorandum, in which this decision was embodied, did not 
qualify for Chevron deference under the Mead standard, and it purported to 
afford this memorandum some deference, but less than full Chevron 
deference.125  On this conclusion, Justice Scalia observed that the Court 
was, in violation of Mead, effectively providing the memorandum Chevron 
deference, but he was happy to join the opinion:  ―I favor overruling Mead.  
Failing that, I am pleased to join an opinion that effectively ignores it.‖126  
Justice Ginsburg‘s dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Stevens and 
Souter, read the statutory scheme to prohibit the permits issued by the 
Corps and did not mention Chevron or any form of deference at all.127  
Once again, the disagreement here may be more about substantive policy 
concerns than matters of judicial methodology.  Chevron does not appear to 
constrain the analysis at all. 
In another illustrative case, the Court agreed with the Department of 
Labor and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission that an 
employee who complains orally has ―filed‖ a complaint within the meaning 
of a statute prohibiting retaliation against persons who file complaints of 
violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act.128  Justice Breyer‘s opinion for 
the Court mentions deference but is unclear on what sort of deference is 
being applied.129  The opinion does not cite Chevron but includes citations 
to decisions applying the arbitrary or capricious test, Skidmore deference, 
and Chevron,130 without specifying the type of deference being applied.  
Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented, and Scalia‘s dissenting opinion 
posited that ―[t]he actual quantum of deference measured out by the Court‘s 
opinion is unclear—seemingly intentionally so.‖131  For his part, Justice 
Scalia found the statute ―clear in light of its context‖132 and thus did not 
defer to the agencies‘ finding that oral complaints are sufficient to trigger 
 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 291. 
 125. Id. at 283–84. 
 126. Id. at 296 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 127. Id. at 296–304 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 128. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011). 
 129. Id. 
 130. See id. at 1335–36 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Babbitt 
v. Sweet Home Chapter of Commys. for Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 703–04 (1995); Motor 
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass‘n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983)). 
 131. See id. at 1340 n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (―The Court says that it is giving ‗a degree 
of weight‘ to the Secretary and EEOC‘s views ‗given Congress‘ delegation of enforcement 
powers to federal administrative agencies.‘ But it never explicitly states the level of 
deference applied, and includes a mysterious citation of United States v. Mead Corp.‖). 
 132. Id. at 1339. 
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the anti-retaliation provisions.  Given that the dissent comprises two of the 
Court‘s most conservative members, it seems more likely that substantive 
differences over whether oral complaints should trigger the anti-retaliation 
obligation provide more explanatory power than methodological concerns. 
In another pair of decisions concerning Chevron‘s coverage, the Roberts 
Court has had some modest success in eliminating complications 
concerning when Chevron applies.  In one of the cases, however, Chief 
Justice Roberts dissented from the Court‘s move toward more uniformity.  
In Mayo Foundation,133 in an opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, the 
unanimous Court held that Chevron deference applies to Department of the 
Treasury regulations concerning the administration of income tax laws.134  
The Court, stressing the need for uniformity in standards of judicial review 
of agency action,135 expressly rejected a less deferential standard that had 
been applied in some earlier cases reviewing Treasury regulations.136 
In the other decision, City of Arlington v. FCC,137 Chief Justice Roberts 
dissented from the Court‘s decision that Chevron deference applies even 
when a case involves the scope of agency jurisdiction.138  Although it was 
sometimes claimed that this issue had been resolved long ago,139 it had also 
been identified as one of those lingering uncertainties surrounding the 
Chevron doctrine.140  Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, found 
application of Chevron to issues of agency jurisdiction to follow from his 
conclusion that ―the distinction between ‗jurisdictional‘ and 
‗nonjurisdictional‘ interpretations is a mirage.  No matter how it is framed, 
the question a court faces when confronted with an agency‘s interpretation 
of a statute it administers is always, simply, whether the agency has stayed 
within the bounds of its statutory authority.‖141  To Justice Scalia, then, all 
agency statutory interpretations are jurisdictional in the sense that they all 
concern the scope of agency authority.  Chief Justice Roberts, in a 
dissenting opinion for himself and Justices Kennedy and Alito, found the 
majority‘s view inconsistent with the congressional-intent basis of the 
Chevron doctrine:   
A court should not defer to an agency until the court decides, on its own, 
that the agency is entitled to deference.  Courts defer to an agency‘s 
interpretation of law when and because Congress has conferred on the 
agency interpretive authority over the question at issue.  An agency 
cannot exercise interpretive authority until it has it; the question whether 
 
 133. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011). 
 134. Id. at 711–12. 
 135. Id. at 713. 
 136. See id. (citing Nat‘l Muffler Dealers Ass‘n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 
(1979)). 
 137. 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013). 
 138. See id. at 1877–86 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 139. See Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 43–44 (1990) (White, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the Court had previously applied Chevron to agency statutory decisions 
affecting agency jurisdiction). 
 140. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 66, at 844 n.54. 
 141. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1868. 
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an agency enjoys that authority must be decided by a court, without 
deference to the agency.142 
This disagreement between Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts 
illustrates a significant weakness in the Chevron doctrine.  Chief Justice 
Roberts is, in my view, correct that deference to jurisdictional 
determinations is inconsistent with the theoretical basis of the Chevron 
doctrine.  However, Justice Scalia may also be correct that the dissent‘s 
view would lead to ―chaos‖ because it would be impossible to construct a 
clear rule distinguishing jurisdictional issues from nonjurisdictional ones.143  
This shows that doctrines built upon fictional theoretical bases are 
inherently unstable.144 
A final thought on this lingering uncertainty over Chevron‘s domain:  it 
is tempting to attribute the problems the Court has had in constructing the 
Chevron doctrine to the nature of a multimember Court and the inevitability 
of disagreement over the politically charged issues that arise in 
administrative law.  This temptation should be resisted.  In other areas of 
law, the Supreme Court has been much more successful in crafting decision 
frameworks that do not suffer from the same degree of uncertainty over 
their domains.  Examples include the tiers of scrutiny that govern equal 
protection claims and the entitlement doctrine that governs the existence of 
property interests in government benefits and employment.  It would be 
very surprising if the Court failed to apply strict scrutiny to a racial 
classification,145 or if the Court determined whether a government 
employee had a property interest in her job without reference to entitlement 
theory.146  In judicial review of agency legal determinations, it is often very 
difficult to know in advance what framework the federal courts will apply.  
This may be due to the complexity of the issues in administrative law and 
the variety of circumstances in which these issues arise.  Perhaps a 
multifactor standard, like Skidmore147 deference, provides a more 
promising framework than Chevron for reviewing agency legal 
determinations. 
CONCLUSION 
For many reasons, the Chevron doctrine is a failure that should be 
jettisoned at the earliest possible time.148  However, it appears that the 
Roberts Court is likely to give us more of the same—that is, an incoherent, 
imprecise, and arbitrarily applied set of principles for reviewing agency 
statutory construction, and decisions that by and large reflect the views of 
the Justices on the substantive issues involved and not disagreement over 
 
 142. Id. at 1877 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 143. Id. at 1874 (majority opinion). 
 144. See Beermann, supra note 3, at 796–97 (discussing how Chevron is built on a 
fictional construction of congressional intent). 
 145. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 146. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538–39 (1985). 
 147. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 148. See Beermann, supra note 3. 
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methodology.  It would be easy to ignore inconsistency at the Supreme 
Court if it were not for the Court‘s failure to provide guidance to the lower 
courts that are supposed to follow the Supreme Court‘s instructions on 
proper standards of judicial review.  Further, endless arguments over the 
applicability of Chevron continue to consume litigation resources and 
distract attention from the substantive merits of agency action under review.  
These are among the numerous reasons for my hope that there will be no 
need for another symposium marking an anniversary of the Chevron 
decision. 
